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Abstract—Enhancement of system capacity is one of the
objectives of the fifth generation (5G) networks in which device-
to-device (D2D) communications is anticipated to play a crucial
role. This can be achieved by devising efficient resource allocation
strategies for the D2D users. Most of the works in resource
allocation assume full knowledge of the channel states. However,
transmitting these increases the control overhead and leads to
wastage of power. Apart from the channel gains between the CUs
and the base station (BS), in order to accommodate D2D users,
the channel gains that need to be transmitted are those between
the cellular users (CUs) and the D2D users and between each
D2D pair. The cardinality of these channel gains is the number
of CUs times the D2D receivers and the number of D2D pairs. In
this paper, with partial channel state information (CSI) at the BS,
we address the problem of D2D resource allocation and ensure
that the interference from the D2D users do not jeopardize the
communications of the CUs. With partial CSI, existing algorithms
determine the Nash equilibrium in a distributed manner, which
in general may not maximize the social utility as the players
try to maximize their own utilities. This is the first work in
D2D resource allocation with partial CSI in which within a
game theoretic framework, an optimal D2D resource allocation
algorithm is proposed which maximizes the social utility of the
D2D players without any inter-D2D interference. We consider
the channel to exhibit path loss. Next, we consider both slow and
fast fading with CU mobility and propose a heuristic algorithm.
We validate the performance of our proposed algorithms through
simulation results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-to-device (D2D) communication is envisioned to be
a promising component of the fifth generation (5G) wireless
networks. It explores the possibility of short range commu-
nication between two D2D users in an underlay Long Term
Evolution (LTE) network so that they can reuse the radio
resources already allocated to cellular users (CUs) through
efficient resource allocation algorithms. The CUs are treated
as primary users which means that their quality of service do
not get affected due to the transmissions of D2D users.
A. Motivation
Most of the previous works on D2D resource allocation
assume perfect channel state information (CSI) [1]- [3]. This
implies that the base station (BS) as a central resource al-
location unit has knowledge of all the channel gains among
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the different communicating entities from which the BS can
determine the achievable rates of all the communication links
in order to design an optimal resource allocation algorithm that
is centralized. The channel gain from a CU to the BS and from
a D2D transmitter to the BS are known because every user
equipment (UE) transmits its channel quality indicator (CQI)
to the BS either periodically or aperiodically [4]. However, it is
difficult for the BS to determine the CQI between a D2D pair
and that between a CU and a D2D receiver. For a fast fading
channel, even if these channel gains are known, conveying
them to the BS in every time slot requires significant control
overhead and power. When some of the channel gains are not
known at the BS, it is known as partial CSI. Thus, partial CSI
is a limiting factor to the BS’s resource allocation capability
which makes this a challenging problem.
With partial CSI, resource allocation problems are generally
modeled game theoretically and distributed resource allocation
algorithms are designed for each UE. As compared to a
centralized system in which the decisions are taken by the
BS, they are now taken by the UEs through a distributed
learning algorithm so as to achieve a certain network objective.
This reduces the computational load at the BS as some of the
computations are done by the UEs themselves. These systems
are generally modeled as non-cooperative in which players
take actions to enhance their own utilities. The resulting Nash
equilibrium solution sometimes fails to achieve a socially
optimum solution since the best response of every player
may not maximize the social utility. The inefficiency of the
Nash equilibrium is highlighted by the well acknowledged
econometric principle, “Tragedy of the Commons”, named
after the celebrated work of Hardin [5] and can be quantified
through the price of anarchy.
B. Related Work
We give an overview of some of the research works per-
taining to D2D resource allocation, assuming perfect CSI,
in a game-theoretic framework. In [6], the authors employ a
Stackelberg game theoretic framework for joint power control
and channel allocation. The existence and uniqueness of the
Stackelberg equilibrium (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium)
is analyzed. The Stackelberg model is also used in [7] in which
the authors state that striving to reach a global maximum
is a difficult mathematical feat and is also computationally
complex. Thus, they propose a low complexity two-stage
algorithm that addresses the power and resource allocation
problems separately. However, the proposed algorithm is sub-
optimal. A reverse iterative combinatorial auction framework
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is proposed in [8] but the iterative nature of the algorithm
increases the communication overhead.
With partial CSI, the application of game theory to D2D
resource allocation problems is limited. In [9], the authors
have proposed a distributed power allocation scheme which is
modeled as a non-cooperative game. They have shown that a
unique Nash equilibrium exists. Though their proposed method
does not require global CSI, it requires the knowledge of local
CSI which increases the signaling overhead. Moreover, for
multiple D2D pairs, they have not addressed the existence of
the Nash equilibrium. In [10], based on the Stackelberg game
model, a distributed iterative scheme of resource allocation is
proposed. However, due to the iterative nature of the algorithm,
signaling overhead is substantial. The authors of [11] propose
a centralized graph based resource allocation scheme and
model the power control problem as an exact potential game.
They show that although a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
maximizes the potential function but it may not maximize
the social utility of the D2D players. In [12], the authors
propose three learning algorithms for an identical interest
game, for a weakly acyclic game and for a weakly acyclic
game with noisy utility measurements in which the actions
of the players converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. In [13],
two distributed learning algorithms are proposed that solve
the coverage optimization problem for sensor networks. It
is formulated as a (constrained) exact potential game. Each
sensor maximizes its coverage and at the same time ensures
that the energy expenditure is reduced. The authors prove that
both the algorithms convergence in probability to a set of
(constrained) Nash equilibria. However, the players exchange
messages among each other which adds to the communication
overhead.
In [14], the authors investigate a different form of equilib-
rium which is stochastically stable and propose a distributed
learning algorithm. In [15], the authors consider the optimal
association of users to base stations. Their work is a modi-
fication of the algorithm of [14]. [16] applies the algorithm
of [14] for the control of turbines in a wind farm so that its
energy production is maximized. The authors of [17] modify
the algorithm proposed in [14] to incorporate information
exchanges where a bit valued variable is transmitted among
the agents. It differs from [14] as it eliminates any structural
restrictions on the utilities of the players. Recently, research
on some different forms of equilibria like potential function
maximizers, correlated equilibria have also been investigated
which gives better results than Nash Equilibrium. In [18]
the authors investigate the optimal monitoring problem and
formulate it as a potential game. They propose a learning
algorithm which convergences in probability to the potential
function maximizers. In [19], the authors have proposed a
distributed learning algorithm in which the joint distribution
of the strategies of players converges to coarse correlated
equilibria, where the objective is to maximize the sum of
expected payoffs of the players. However, the players need
a common random signal. Similarly, in [20] the authors have
proposed a learning algorithm where the empirical frequency
of the collective strategy of the players corresponds to the
coarse correlated (Hannan) equilibrium. The advantage of this
algorithm is that it does not require any information exchange
among the players.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we employ a game theoretic framework for
resource allocation while ensuring that the quality of service
(QoS) of the CUs is satisfied which implies that their signal-
to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) requirements should be
met.
The contributions of our work are as follows:
• We apply the distributed algorithm proposed in [15], which
is a modification of the algorithm proposed in [14], to
D2D resource allocation which is non-trivial and propose
an optimal partially distributed algorithm by considering
only pathloss. We demonstrate how interdependence can be
designed within the framework of the algorithm proposed
in [15]. In both [14] and [15], no randomness in the system
model has been considered, which is a challenging problem.
We have considered fading with mobility of CUs. With
this randomness into consideration, we have extended the
optimal algorithm and proposed a heuristic algorithm which
gives a good performance.
• Our work differs from [15] in that our algorithm is not a
completely distributed algorithm. In [15], time fairness is
ensured to the players which are associated to the same
BS so that the throughput or utility observed by a player
is its transmission rate divided by the total number of
players. This results in a decrease in its throughput and thus
the network throughput. However, in our algorithm the BS
allocates orthogonal resources to the D2D players which
ensures that inter-D2D interference does not occur which
would have decreased the D2D network’s throughput.
• In [15], when multiple players are associated to a BS, a
player’s throughput decreases when multiple players are
associated with the same BS which results in interdepen-
dence. However in our paper, we ensure interdependence
in a different way by designing a round robin (RR) based
algorithm at the BS and a frame structure from which the
utility is calculated. Note that without the BS, inter-D2D
interference can also bring about interdependence among
the D2D players as each D2D player’s rate gets affected
due to the interference from the D2D players which are
allocated the same resources. However, this would decrease
the D2D network’s throughput and reduce the throughput of
CUs also.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we
present the system model which comprises of an underlay D2D
network and the game theoretic model of the D2D resource
allocation problem. In Section III, we propose an optimal
resource allocation algorithm for the D2D players. We next
discuss how the system state process is a finite state discrete
time Markov chain (DTMC) in Section IV. In Section V, we
prove the optimality of the proposed algorithm. We present an
example to demonstrate its optimality in Section VI. Next, in
Section VII we consider both slow fading and fast fading with
CU mobility and propose a heuristic algorithm. We verify the
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Fig. 1: Resource reuse between a CU and a D2D pair.
performance of our proposed algorithms through simulations
in Section VIII. In Section IX, we summarize our findings.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We consider a cell with a BS, NC CUs in uplink transmis-
sion mode and ND D2D pairs. We assume that the BS has
already allocated resources to these CUs. In an LTE network,
resources are blocks of time and frequency. We denote the BS
by B, a CU by c and a D2D pair by d. As shown in Fig. 1,
the channel gain between a CU c to the BS B is denoted by
gcB and the channel gain between the D2D transmitter to the
BS B is given by gdB . We assume that both these channel
gains are known at the BS. Similarly, for a D2D pair d, the
channel gain between its transmitter and receiver is given by
gd. The channel gain between a CU c and the D2D receiver
is given by gcd. We assume that the channel gains gd and gcd
are not known. We consider the channel to exhibit pathloss.
Let a CU’s transmit power be PC and that of a D2D user’s
be PD. Given that a D2D user d is allocated the resources of
a CU c, the SINR of the CU c is given by,
γc =
PC gcB
PD gdB +N0
, (1)
where N0 is the average noise power.
B. Game Theoretic Model
Let G be a strategic form game with ND D2D players
constituting a set ND = {d1, d2, ... , dND}. Each D2D player
d can choose an action from a set of finite actions Ad. Let
the joint action set be A = ANDd and the utility function be
Ud : A → R.
As per the LTE standard, time is divided into subframes of
1 ms duration. We define a frame to consist of ND successive
subframes. A subframe is indexed by n˜ while a frame by
n. The start and end of a frame are indexed by mND + 1
and mND + ND where m = 0, 1, 2, ... . At the start of a
frame n, the action taken by a D2D player d is to select a
list ld(n) and transmit it to the BS. The list contains K CUs
drawn from a set NC = {c1, c2, ... , cNC} of available CUs to
form a K-tuple. Hence, the total number of lists that a D2D
player can generate is K permutations of NC CUs, L = NCPK
which constitutes the action set Ad of a D2D player. Let the
action profile be l = (l1, l2, ... , lND ) ∈ A. We denote l−d to
be the action profile of the D2D players other than the D2D
player d. Therefore, the action profile can also be written as
l = (ld, l−d).
We design an algorithm at the BS which decides the
allocation of CU’s resources to the D2D players in each
subframe n˜ as per the lists. Using these resources, each D2D
player transmits and observes a rate of rd(n˜) given by,
rd(n˜) = B log2
(
PD gd
PC gcd +N0
)
. (2)
Definition 1. (Utility) The utility of a D2D player d is
calculated at the end of a frame n and is the average of the
rates obtained by it over all the subframes of a frame. It is
given by,
rd(n) =
1
ND
ND∑
n˜=1
rd(n˜). (3)
The algorithm at the BS ensures that the utility of each D2D
player is a function of the lists of all the D2D players (action
profile l), rd(n) = Ud(l). We normalize the utility rd(n) such
that it is strictly bounded between 0 and 1 [14].
Definition 2. (Social Utility) The social utility is the sum of
utilities of the D2D players in every frame n and is given by
Wl(n) =
∑
d∈ND rd(n).
Our objective is to maximize the social utility of the D2D
players in every frame n, over all possible action profiles l, to
get the socially optimal action profile l∗(n), subject to a rate
constraint of rtgtd for each D2D player,
l∗(n) = arg max
l
∑
d∈ND
rd(n),
s.t. rd(n) ≥ rtgtd , ∀d ∈ ND. (4)
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
The proposed resource allocation algorithm convergences
to the optimal actions provided interdependence is ascertained
in the game. Interdependence implies that the utility of every
player is affected by the actions of other players.
Definition 3. (Interdependence, [14]) A game G is interde-
pendent if for every action profile l ∈ A and for every
proper subset of players N ⊂ ND, there exists a player
d /∈ N and a choice of actions l′N ∈ A|N |d such that
rd(l
′
N , l−N ) 6= rd(lN , l−N ).
We consider the internal state variables of a D2D player to
be its list ld(n), its utility rd(n) and another variable called
its mood md(n). We define the present state sd(n) of a D2D
player d to be sd(n) = (ld(n), rd(n), md(n)). The mood
can take two values: content (C) and discontent (D). The
resource allocation algorithm (refer to Algorithm 1) consists of
the following stages: 1) list selection of a D2D player, 2) the
BS’s resource allocation rule 3) utility calculation of a D2D
player and 4) its mood calculation.
A. List Selection
The list selection for every D2D player is done on a frame
by frame basis. The mood of a D2D player in the previous
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Fig. 2: RR sequencing and the selection of CUs from the lists
of all the D2D players in the first subframe of a frame.
frame helps it to select its list in the present frame. Let  be the
exploration rate, such that  > 0 and k is a constant such that
k > ND [8]. A D2D player whose mood is content can either
retain (exploit) its previous list with probability 1−k or select
(explore) a new list with probability k/(L − 1). It is more
likely to retain its previous list rather than exploring other lists
if k is less than 1− 1/L. Increasing  results in an increase
in exploration. However, increasing k results in a decrease in
k due to which the probability of exploring becomes less. A
discontent D2D player explores all the L possible lists with a
probability of 1/L. Steps 2-7 of Algorithm 1 demonstrate the
list selection method for a D2D player d. Once this is over
for all the D2D players, every D2D player transmits its list to
the BS. The BS then allocates the resources of the CUs to the
D2D players as per the following allocation algorithm.
B. Allocation Algorithm at the BS
1) RR algorithm: At the beginning of every frame, the lists
of all the D2D players are available at the BS. The BS follows
a RR sequence in every subframe to prioritize which D2D
player’s list to select in every subframe. In the first subframe of
every frame the BS orders the D2D players in a RR sequence,
RR seq = d1, d2, ... , dND as shown in Fig. 2 which shifts
by one in the next subframe so that the RR seq starts from
d2, RR seq = d2, ... , dND , d1. This continues till the last
subframe ND when the RR sequence starts from dND . Thus,
the selection of the first player varies in every subframe of a
frame.
2) Orthogonal allocation of resources: In every subframe,
the BS ensures orthogonal allocation of CU resources. It
selects the first element (a CU) from a D2D player’s list
and allocates this CU’s resources to it if it is not allocated
to players prior to it in the RR sequence followed in that
subframe (see Fig. 2). If this element has already been assigned
to another D2D player, the BS selects the next element of the
D2D player’s list till it reaches the end of the list. In case
all the elements of its list are already assigned to the other
players, it is not allocated any CU’s resource.
3) Interdependence: Interdependence is enforced among
the players due to the orthogonal allocation of CUs’ resources
in a subframe, the RR prioritization of D2D players across
subframes and the way in which the utility is calculated. In
every subframe, the allocation of a CU’s resources to a D2D
Algorithm 1 Resource Allocation Algorithm
1: Initialize RR seq ← [d1 d2 ... dND ], x = 0
List Selection (md(n− 1), ld(n− 1))
2: if md(n− 1) == C then
3: ld(n)← i, w.p. kL−1 , ∀ i ∈ Ad\ld(n− 1)
4: ld(n)← ld(n− 1), w.p. 1− k
5: else
6: ld(n)← i, w.p. 1L , ∀ i ∈ Ad
7: end if
Allocation Algorithm at the BS (l(n))
8: c← ALLOCBS(l(n))
Utility Calculation (c, rd(n˜))
9: x← x+ 1
10: qd(x)← rd(n˜)
11: if n˜ == mND +ND then
12: x← 0
13: rd(n)← sum(qd)/ND
14: end if
Mood Calculation (sd(n− 1), ld(n), rd(n))
15: if md(n − 1) == C & [ld(n − 1), rd(n − 1)] ==
[ld(n), rd(n)] then
16: md(n)← C
17: else if rd(n) ≥ rtgtd then
18: md(n)← C, w.p. 1−rd(n)
19: md(n)← D, w.p. 1− 1−rd(n)
20: else
21: md(n)← D
22: end if
player depends on whether it has been allocated to others or
not. This creates dependence of the D2D players on those
players appearing before it in the RR sequence. However, in
the first subframe the D2D player with the highest priority
remains unaffected by the players whose priority is lesser to
it. Therefore, when the priority changes in the next subframe, it
has to depend on the other players also. In this way all the D2D
players get affected due to each other. As seen from Fig. 2,
consider the first subframe and the D2D player d1 which gets
the first priority. It selects a CU c5 from its list l1(n) which
does not get affected by the choice of CUs (or lists) of other
players because it gets the first precedence over others in the
RR sequence followed in the first subframe. Thus, its rate does
not depend on the lists (actions) of others. However, as the RR
sequence changes in the second subframe, its priority shifts to
the next D2D player d2. Then the priority of d1 becomes ND.
Thus, its CU selection and its rate gets affected by the choice
of CUs (or lists) of other players appearing before it in the RR
sequence. When its utility is calculated at the end of a frame
as an average of its rates obtained in every subframe, since
its rate gets affected due to the lists of others, its utility also
gets affected due to the lists of the others. As per Definition
3, this ensures interdependence because a player’s utility then
depends on the actions of others.
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Algorithm 2 Allocation Algorithm at the BS in every sub-
frame n˜
Input: l(n), RR seq
Output: c
1: function ALLOCBS(l(n), RR seq)
2: index ← 1
3: for all j = 1 to ND do
4: d← RR seq[index]
5: Select D2D player d’s list
6: list index← 1
7: while list index 6= list length+ 1 do
8: c← ld(n, list index)
9: if c is not assigned to players before d then
10: Assign c’s resources to d
11: Break
12: else
13: list index← list index+ 1
14: end if
15: end while
16: if γc < γtgt then
17: c’s resources are not allocated to d
18: end if
19: index← index+ 1
20: end for
21: Left shift RR seq by 1
22: end function
We now discuss the importance of list selection. If a D2D
player does not send a list and instead selects a CU and
conveys it to the BS, then the BS in order to ensure interde-
pendence can communicate to it that this CU has already been
chosen by another D2D player. So, it needs to choose another
CU and convey it to the BS. This can happen many times,
which increases the communication overhead between the BS
and the D2D player. Instead of this, if the D2D player sends
a list to the BS, then the BS can check if the first element
of its list is already allocated to another D2D player. If so,
then it can select the next element of the D2D player’s list.
This is equivalent to communicating another choice of CU
by the D2D player to the BS. Hence, sending a list reduces
the control overhead and also conserves the BS’s power and
resources.
4) Allocation Test: In order to ensure that CU communi-
cations are not hampered in each subframe, the BS checks
whether its SINR decreases below γtgt due to the interference
from the D2D transmitter. If it decreases below γtgt, the BS
does not allocate its resources to the D2D player. Hence,
the D2D player’s rate rd(n˜) becomes zero. After this test,
the BS conveys to each D2D player which CU’s resources
are allocated to it. The mapping of CUs’ resources to the
D2D players is termed as an allocation profile. For example,
from Fig. 2 if we assume that the CUs c5, c1, c3, ... , c8
selected by the BS from the lists l1(n) to lND (n) of the D2D
players pass the allocation test, then the allocation profile is
(c5, c1, c3, ... , c8).
C. Utility Calculation
In a subframe n˜, a D2D player transmits using the resources
of the CU allocated to it and observes a rate rd(n˜). At the end
of a frame, it calculates its utility rd(n) as per Eqn. 3.
D. Mood Calculation
The mood of a D2D player is determined (refer to the
lines 15-22 of Algorithm 1) at the end of each frame from
its previous state, its present list and utility. A content D2D
player will remain content, if its present configuration does not
not change with respect to its previous one, (ld(n), rd(n)) =
(ld(n − 1), rd(n − 1)). However this condition is violated
if ld(n) 6= ld(n − 1) or rd(n) 6= rd(n − 1) or both. We
next explain these cases. Suppose a content D2D player d
decides to explore other lists. Then, its list ld(n) changes and
ld(n) 6= ld(n− 1). If this player decides to retain its previous
list, ld(n) = ld(n−1), its present utility rd(n) can still change
with respect to its previous utility rd(n− 1) because if some
other player changes its list, then the utility of this player
can change because of interdependence. Therefore, as its
configuration changes, the chances of becoming discontent or
content depends on its present utility rd(n). If rd(n) is greater
than the minimum required rate rtgtd , it becomes content with
probability 1−rd(n). The chances of becoming content are
more than that of becoming discontent, if rd(n) is sufficiently
high. If rd(n) is less than r
tgt
d , then it becomes discontent with
probability (w.p.) one.
For a discontent D2D player d to become content, it has to
explore all the lists uniformly randomly. If its utility rd(n) is
greater than rtgtd , it becomes content with probability 
1−rd(n)
or else it will remain discontent.
IV. SYSTEM STATE PROCESS
The collection of states of all the D2D players constitute
the system state s(n) = (s1(n), ... , sND (n)). Let the action
profile in every frame n be l(n) = (l1(n), ... , lND (n)), the
utility profile be r(n) = (r1(n), ... , rND (n)) and the mood
profile be m(n) = (m1(n), ... , mND (n)).
Lemma 1. ( [14], [15]) The system state process s(n) is a
finite state, aperiodic and irreducible DTMC.
Proof. 1) The selection of the present list ld(n) of a D2D
player depends on its previous mood and its previous list. Its
present mood md(n) is determined from its previous state.
Its utility rd(n) depends on the lists of the other players.
Therefore, its present state sd(n) = (ld(n), rd(n), md(n))
depends on its previous state. Hence, the system state process
s(n) is a DTMC.
2) Let us rearrange s(n) in terms of the action, utility and
mood profiles as s(n) = (l(n), r(n), m(n)). Consider the
sets A, U and M to contain all possible values of l(n), r(n)
and m(n). Let the set S ′ = A × U ×M be the state space
of all possible combinations of l(n), r(n) and m(n). We next
prove that the system state space S is a subset of S ′.
Let the cardinality of the space of l(n), r(n) and m(n) be
|A|, |U| and |M|. Since each of the ND D2D players can
choose any of the L possible lists, |A| = LND . We know that
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the utility rd(n) is a function of the action profile l(n), that is,
rd(n) = Ud(l). Multiple action profiles can generate allocation
profiles in a frame such that it results in the same utility
profile. For example, if there are 3 players and they generate
lists such that the first element of their lists are different from
each other then it will generate the same allocation profile in
every subframe. If the last two elements of every list changes,
then also the allocation profile in every subframe will be the
same and hence the utility remains the same. Thus, Ud(·) is
a many to one function. Hence, |U| is less than |A|. Since
the mood of every D2D player can take two possible values,
|M| = 2ND . Moreover, those states in which at least one D2D
player d’s utility rd(n) is less than r
tgt
d and yet its mood md(n)
is content, cannot be part of the state space S. Therefore, S
is finite and is a subset of S ′.
3) Since self transitions are possible from every system state,
the DTMC is aperiodic.
4) As the system states communicate with each other, they
form a single recurrent communication class. Thus, the DTMC
is irreducible.
Since the DTMC is finite, aperiodic and irreducible, it is
ergodic and has a unique stationary distribution pi. Let us
denote the transition probability matrix by P  which is a
perturbed version of P 0 (with  equal to zero) [14], [21]. The
transitions in P 0 occur in P  with high probabilities. With
a very small probability some transitions in P  occur which
would not have occurred in P 0. For all states s1, s2 ∈ S, the
state transitions P s1s2 converges to P
0
s1s2 as  tends to zero,
i.e, lim→0P s1s2 = P
0
s1s2 . Also, the stationary distribution
pi converges to pi0 as  tends to zero, lim→0pi = pi0,
where pi0 is a stationary distribution of P 0. A state s∗ is
stochastically stable if pi0s∗ > 0. We are interested in finding
these stochastically stable states, each of which is a tuple of
the optimal action profile (the optimal lists), the utility profile
which maximizes the social utility such that the rate of each
player is satisfied and the mood profile in which each D2D
player is content. This solves the problem stated in Eqn. 4.
Theorem 1. ( [14], [15]) The stochastically stable states of a
regular perturbed DTMC are the states s∗ ∈ S, which satisfy
the following conditions:
1) The action profile l(n) should maximize the social utility
Wl =
∑
d∈ND rd(l) while satisfying the rate constraints of
the D2D players.
2) For each D2D player d, its utility rd(n) should be aligned
to the action profile l(n), that is, rd(n) = Ud(l).
3) In a stochastically stable state s∗, all the D2D players must
be content.
We next prove Theorem 1 to show that when we incorporate
a frame structure and a RR based algorithm at the BS within
the framework of the algorithm of [15] to design interde-
pendence, the system still converges to the stochastically
stable states. As in [15] our algorithm ensures probabilistic
convergence to Pareto (efficient) actions instead of almost sure
convergence. This implies that the system spends most of the
time in its optimal states.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We define a few terms as follows [14], [21].
Definition 4. (Resistance of Transition) Let P s1s2 be the tran-
sition probability from the system state s1 to s2. If P s1s2 > 0
for some  > 0, then there exists a unique real number
rs1s2 ≥ 0 called the resistance of transition from s1 to s2
such that 0 < lim→0
P s1s2
rs1s2
< ∞. If P 0s1s2 > 0, then the
resistance rs1s2 is zero.
Definition 5. (i-Tree) In a directed graph G, an i-tree Ti is
a spanning tree such that there is exactly one directed path
from every vertex j 6= i to i.
Definition 6. (Resistance of an i-Tree) The resistance rTi of
an i-tree Ti is the sum of resistances of its edges.
Definition 7. (Stochastic Potential) In a directed graph G,
the stochastic potential γi of vertex i is the minimum i-tree
resistance among the resistances of all possible i-trees.
Definition 8. (Stochastically Stable States) The stochasti-
cally stable states of a perturbed DTMC with a transition
probability matrix P  are the states which are contained in
the recurrence classes of P 0 with the minimum stochastic
potential.
We now identify the different recurrence classes of P 0.
Lemma 2. ( [14], [15]) The recurrence classes of P 0 are: 1)
the class D0 consisting of all the system states in which every
D2D player is discontent and 2) the set of all singleton classes
C0 = {C0}, where in each system state C0, every D2D player
is content.
Proof. 1) In a system state of D0, all the D2D players are
discontent and explore lists uniformly randomly. As their lists
(actions) change, their state changes and thus the action profile
also changes. This results in a system state transition. The BS
allocates CUs from the lists of the D2D players as per the RR
based algorithm in every subframe of a frame. Irrespective
of whether the utility of a D2D player rd(n) is greater than
rtgtd or not, since  is equal to zero every discontent D2D
player remains discontent with probability one (refer to the
lines 17-22 of Algorithm 1). Thus, a system state in D0 can
only transition to one of the states in D0. It cannot transition
to any of the content states in C0 or to any transient state
where some of the D2D players are content while others
are discontent. Hence, D0 is a recurrence class of P 0. A
system state s′ ∈ S in which some of the D2D players
are content while others are discontent is a transient state
because of the following reason. A discontent D2D player
selects its list uniformly randomly and remains discontent with
probability one as  is zero. Due to the change of actions of
the discontent players, the utility of a content D2D player
can get affected (interdependence enforced by the BS). Thus,
the content D2D player’s utility can change, even though its
list (action) does not change. Since its configuration changes,
that is, (ld(n − 1), rd(n − 1)) 6= (ld(n), rd(n)), it becomes
discontent with probability one. Gradually, all the content D2D
players become discontent. Thus, the state s′ transitions to one
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Fig. 3: Graph G to determine γC0 and γD0 .
of the discontent states of D0. Hence, all such system states
s′ ∈ S are transient.
2) Let us consider a state in C0 in which every D2D player
is content. Referring to Algorithm 1, if  is zero, the D2D
players retain their previous lists in the present frame with
probability one. The action profile of the system therefore
remains the same over frames. Due to the RR based allocation
at the BS, the set of allocation profiles of a frame also
remains the same over all the frames and thus the utility profile
also remains the same. As there is no change in any of the
D2D player’s configuration, every content D2D player remains
content. Therefore, a system state in C0 maintains its state
because the action profile, the utility profile and the mood
profile remain the same. These are therefore absorbing states
and are recurrent.
With perturbation , we now consider the regular perturbed
process with transition probability matrix P  and determine
the stochastic potential of these recurrence classes. Let the
stochastic potential of C0 and D0 be γC0 and γD0 respectively.
The minimum resistance of transition from C0 → D0,
D0 → C0 and C0 → C0 can be determined as follows.
1) The transition from C0 to a state in D0 can occur when
at least one content player decides to explore with probability
k/(L−1). Its list changes due to which it affects the utility of
the other content D2D players and their configuration changes.
Thus, content D2D players become discontent. Therefore, the
minimum resistance of transition from C0 to D0 is k.
2) Similarly, the transition from a system state in D0 to
C0 occurs when every discontent D2D player explores lists
uniformly randomly. From these lists the BS allocates CUs
to the D2D players in every subframe. Every D2D player
calculates its utility at the end of the frame and if its utility
is greater than its target rate rtgtd then it becomes content
with probability 1−rd(n). Thus, the minimum resistance of
transition from D0 to C0 is
∑
d∈ND (1− rd(n)).
3) The transition from a content state to another content state
in C0 can occur when a content D2D player explores. If rd(n)
is greater than rtgtd , then the minimum resistance of transition
is k +mind∈ND (1− rd(n)).
Let us consider the system state space S to consist of three
recurrence classes: D0 and two singleton classes in the set C0.
We construct a directed graph G with these recurrence classes
as its vertices and denote them by x, y and z. Fig. 3 shows the
transitions or edges between the different recurrence classes.
Lemma 3. ( [14], [15]) The stochastic potential of a recur-
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Fig. 4: Example demonstrating the optimal mapping of re-
sources between the CUs and the D2D pairs.
rence class C0 is given by γC0 = k(|C0| − 1) +
∑
d∈ND (1−
rd(n)).
Proof. From graph G of Fig. 3, there are three possible i-trees,
T1, T2 and T3 that are rooted at vertex y. We represent them by
a set of directed edges as follows: T1 = {(x, y), (z, y)}, T2 =
{(x, z), (z, y)} and T3 = {(z, x), (x, y)}. The minimum resis-
tances of these three i-trees are rT1 = rT2 = k+mind∈ND (1−
rd(n))+
∑
d∈ND (1−rd(n)) and rT3 = k+
∑
d∈ND (1−rd(n)).
Thus, the minimum resistance i-tree is T3 with resistance rT3 ,
which is the stochastic potential of C0. If the total number of
states in C0 is |C0|, then the stochastic potential of C0 is given
by γC0 = k(|C0| − 1) +
∑
d∈ND (1− rd(n)).
Lemma 4. ( [14], [15]) The stochastic potential of the
recurrence class D0 is given by γD0 = k|C0|.
Proof. From graph G, we note that there are three possi-
ble i-trees rooted at the vertex x, T1 = {(y, x), (z, x)},
T2 = {(z, y), (y, x)} and T3 = {(y, z), (z, x)}. The minimum
resistance of these i-trees are rT1 = 2k and rT2 = rT3 =
2k + mind∈Nd(1 − rd(n)). Thus, T1 is the i-tree with the
minimum resistance rT1 , which is the stochastic potential of
D0. When the number of states in C0 is |C0|, the stochastic
potential of D0 is given by γD0 = k|C0|.
The stochastic potential of C0 is therefore less than that of
D0, i.e., γC0 < γD0 . Thus, the stochastically stable states
are present in the recurrence classes of C0 which have the
minimum stochastic potential.
The optimal action profile l∗(n) is the one that minimizes
γC0 and is given by,
l∗(n) ∈ arg min
l∈A
k(|C0| − 1) +
∑
d∈ND
(1− rd(n)),
which is equivalent to maximizing the social utility,
l∗(n) ∈ arg max
l∈A
∑
d∈ND
rd(n).
This completes the proof.
VI. CONCEPT ILLUSTRATION
We demonstrate through the following example how our
algorithm converges to a Pareto optimal solution such that
at least one of the player’s utility is the best with none of
the other players’ utilities any worse off either. We consider
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Fig. 5: Social utility of the D2D players over frames for the
concept illustration example.
a simple topology to illustrate how the social utility can be
maximized. In order to theoretically calculate it we assume
that all the channel gains are known. We can then determine
the rates of the D2D players. We then show through simula-
tions that our proposed algorithm also gives the same value
of the social utility.
1) Topology: Three CUs c1, c2 and c3 are positioned in a semi-
circle of radius R1 as shown in Fig. 4. Three D2D pairs d1,
d2 and d3 are positioned in an outer semi-circle of radius R2.
2) Parameter Setting: Let R1 = 50 m and R2 = 100 m. Every
D2D transmitter subtends an angle of 10 degree at the BS with
respect to its receiver. The distance between a D2D transmitter
and receiver is 17.43 m. Let PD and PC be equal to 10 mW,
the path loss exponent α = 2, the pathloss model be 1/dα,
N0 = 0.1 mW, B = 1 Hz and γtgt = 0 dB. We set r
tgt
d of
each D2D player to 50 % of the rates that they achieve when
the allocation profile is (c1, c2, c3).
3) Analysis: The distances of the CUs and the D2D trans-
mitters to the BS are R1 and R2. The powers received from
the CUs are the same. The powers received from the D2D
transmitters are also the same. Hence, the SINRs of all the
CUs are the same no matter what the allocation profile is. We
assume the SINRs to be higher than γtgt.
The best CU for a D2D player is one which is farthest from
a D2D player’s receiver. If CU c1’s resources are allocated
to D2D pair d3, then CU c2’s resources can be allocated
to either d1 or d2. If c2’s resources are allocated to d2,
then d2 faces the worst case interference from c2. Thus,
c3’s resources need to be allocated to d1. This allocation
is not socially optimal because d1 and d3 get their best
CUs while d2 gets the worst. Thus, c2’s resources should
be allocated to d1 and c3’s resources should be allocated
to d2. Therefore, a1 = (c2, c3, c1) is an optimal allocation
profile. The allocation profile a2 = (c3, c1, c2) is also optimal.
With allocation profile a1 = (c2, c3, c1), the rates of the D2D
players are rd1 = 0.4076, rd2 = 0.4076 and rd3 = 0.4089
bps. Thus, the utility profile r(n) is (0.4076, 0.4076, 0.4089).
Therefore, the maximum value of the social utility is the sum
of these rates which is 1.224 bps.
4) Verification: We simulate Algorithm 1 with the above topol-
ogy and parameter setting. We set  = 0.5 and k = 11. Let
the mood md = 1 when a player is content and md = 0 when
it is discontent. Normalized mood is the average of the moods
of all the players. When they are content it is one when atleast
one player is discontent it is less than one. We then obtain a
plot of the social utility and the normalized mood of the D2D
players across the frames as shown in Fig. 5. We observe from
Fig. 5 that the maximum value of the social utility of the D2D
players is 1.224 bps with the normalized mood equal to one.
This matches our theoritical calculation. Two of the optimal
action profiles are as follows: l∗1(n) = ([2 1]
T, [3 1]T, [1 3]T)
and l∗2(n) = ([3 1]
T, [1 2]T, [2 3]T). When the action profile is
l∗1(n), the BS as per the RR based algorithm determines the op-
timal allocation profile as (c2, c3, c1) in every subframe. When
the action profile is l∗2(n), the optimal allocation profile is
(c3, c1, c2) in every subframe. These allocation profiles match
our theoretically obtained ones. Thus, these two optimal action
profiles, their corresponding utility profiles and the content
mood profiles constitute two stochastically stable states.
VII. FADING AND CU MOBILITY
We now consider slow fading due to shadowing as well
as fast fading. When the CUs are mobile and their location
information is unavailable, devising efficient resource alloca-
tion algorithms for the D2D players is a challenging task. The
mobility of a CU is characterized by its velocity and direction
of movement. The distance of a CU to the D2D player’s
receiver changes with time when the CU is mobile. Thus, the
D2D player’s SINR and its rate vary over subframes. When
the channel model is a pathloss model then an action profile
maps to a unique utility profile. However, with fading and
mobility, an action profile can generate infinite utility profiles.
Thus, the number of states in the DTMC becomes infinite and
the system states become transient. Therefore, for this DTMC,
the steady state distribution pi does not exist and thus pi0 does
not exist. Thus, Algorithm 1 fails to converge. We modify it
and devise a novel utility calculation method such that on
an average the system performance does not degrade. This
method is threshold based and the main concept is to detect
a significant change in the network topology and the channel
due to which the resource allocation would change.
A. Threshold Based Utility Calculation
We modify Algorithm 1 so that a frame is repeated ND
times to form a superframe which is indexed by nˆ. The list
selection by a D2D player and its mood calculation occurs
at epochs which are multiples of a superframe instead of a
frame. The list generation occurs at the beginning of each
superframe, the allocation method at the BS remains the same
and the mood calculation is done at the end of a superframe.
In Algorithm 1 the index n for a frame will be replaced with
nˆ for a superframe. The start of a superframe is indexed by
mN2D + 1, while the end of the first frame of a superframe is
indexed by mN2D + ND where m = 0, 1, 2, ... . The utility
calculation method will now differ, which we explain next
(refer to Algorithm 3).
In any subframe n˜, two pieces of information are available
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Algorithm 3 Threshold Based Utility Calculation
1: if mN2D + 1 ≤ n˜ ≤ mN2D +ND then
2: x← x+ 1
3: ad(x)← c
4: if n˜ == mN2D +ND then
5: x← 0
6: end if
7: end if
8: if c passes the allocation test then
9: nd(c)← nd(c) + 1
10: ra(c)←
(
1− 1nd(c)
)
ra(c) +
1
nd(c)
rd(n˜)
11: end if
12: if n˜ == (m+ 1)N2D then
13: for all c = 1 to NC do
14: if ud(c) == 0 or abs(ud(c)− ra(c)) > ∆ then
15: ud(c)← ra(c)
16: end if
17: end for
18: rd(nˆ)← sum(ud(ad))/ND
19: end if
to a D2D player d: 1) the cth CU whose resources are allocated
to it and 2) its rate rd(n˜) when it transmits using this CU’s
resources. In a continuum of subframes, a CU c’s resources
can be allocated to it several times, though it may not be
allocated exactly in two consecutive subframes.
However, every time that it is allocated this CU’s resources,
it observes a change in its rate as a result of the CU’s mobility
and the channel. Let us say that in the first frame of length
ND of a superframe, it is allocated the resources of different
CUs. It stores this sequence of CUs in a vector ad of length
ND. Every time it observes that CU c’s (which has passed
the allocation test) resources are allocated to it, it calculates
a running average of its previous rates observed with this CU
over subframes and the present rate using Monte Carlo (MC)
averaging and stores it in a vector ra of length NC at its cth
index. It also stores the number of times that it is allocated CU
c’s resources in a vector nd of length NC at its cth index. This
is required for the MC averaging which is also done for all the
other CUs whose resources are allocated to it. When this CU’s
resources are allocated for the first time to it, then its rate is
updated in ra at its cth index. It also maintains a vector ud
of length NC . At the end of every superframe, it checks the
entries of ud and in whichever indices of ud it finds a zero,
it stores the average rates of ra from these indices to ud. If it
finds non-zero entries in some indices of ud, then it calculates
an absolute difference of these entries with those of ra. If any
of the resultants exceed a threshold ∆, then the values of ud
at those indices are updated with the corresponding values of
ra.
At the end of a superframe nˆ, it retrieves the rates from the
indices of the vector ud, where the indices are the contents
of the vector ad. It then sums up these rates and divides it
by ND to obtain its utility rd(nˆ). Its mood is then determined
from its utility, its list and its previous state as per the mood
calculation method of Algorithm 1.
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Fig. 6: Social utility of the D2D players over frames for
Algorithm 1.
VIII. RESULTS
In this section, we verify the performances of the proposed
algorithms. The simulation parameters are as follows. We
consider a circular cell model whose radius is 250 m in which
the CUs (NC = 10) and the D2D transmitters (ND = 10) are
uniformly distributed. A D2D receiver is uniformly distributed
around a D2D transmitter within a range of 50 m. The same
seed is used for the simulation results. Let PC = 250 mW
and PD = 1 mW. We consider the LTE pathloss model,
PL = 128.1 + 37.6 log (d). The UE and BS noise figures
are 9 dB and 5 dB respectively. The thermal noise density is
-174 dBm. We assume that each CU is allocated two physical
resource blocks (PRBs) of 180 kHz bandwidth. Let γtgt = 0
dB and the minimum rate rtgtd for each D2D player be 50 %
of the rates observed by them in their initial positions.Note
that the total number of lists L from which a D2D player can
select a list depends on the length of a list because L = NCPK .
If K increases, L increases and the number of bits to transmit
a list increases. Therefore, we set the length of the lists to 3.
A. Without Fading and Mobility of CUs
Fig. 6 demonstrates the performance of Algorithm 1 with
two different values of  and k. We choose  and k through
trial and error. When choosing these design parameters we
must note that the exploration probability depends on them.
If it is very high then the D2D players explore more due to
which the duration for which the system states are maintained
becomes small. If it is very low then the D2D players explore
so less that the transition from one system state to another
occurs infrequently and the system may not be able to find
the stochastically stable states. We set  = 0.7 and k = 23
and then increase  to 0.8 and k to 31 which results in the
exploration rate to increase and the D2D players explore lists
more often. Thus, their individual utilities change more often
due to a change in the action profile which is reflected in the
fluctuations observed in the social utility of the D2D players.
The average social utility of the D2D players over frames is
approximately 5 Mbps.
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Fig. 7: Social utility of the D2D players over superframes with
the threshold based utility calculation method.
B. With Fading and Mobility of CUs
We model slow fading with lognormal random variables
(RVs) of standard deviation 8 dB. For fast fading we model
the channel gains as independent and exponentially distributed
RVs with mean 1.
Mobility Model: We employ the following model to
characterize the mobility of the CUs. The CUs start from
their initial positions and choose directions that are uniformly
distributed between 0 and 360 degree. We assume a constant
pedestrian speed of 1 m/s for all the CUs. The number of
subframes T for which it travels till it changes its direction is
a geometrically distributed RV with mean (1− p)/p, where p
is the probability of success in each trial. We set p = 10−5.
The CU after T subframes does not pause unlike the random
direction model, instead it again chooses a direction that is
randomly uniformly distributed. When it hits the boundary of
the circular cell, it chooses a random direction. The range of
angles that it can choose from is limited because it should
not cross the boundary. If the time when it hits the boundary
is a fraction in milliseconds then the decimal part needs to
be truncated because the subframes are of 1 ms duration
and the position of a CU is assumed to be sampled at the
start of every subframe. Thus, the resulting distance is within
the boundary. This model differs from the random direction
model because the pause times are zero [22] and the speed is
constant instead of a uniformly distributed RV.
When we incorporate the threshold based utility calculation
method in Algorithm 1, we observe the following results with
∆ = 0.01 when the factor by which the rates are normalized
is 10 Mbps. Fig. 7 shows a typical sample path realization of
the social utility of the D2D players over superframes with 
and k equal to 0.7 and 31. We increase  to 0.8 and k to 35
and observe that the D2D players explore more. The average
social utility of the D2D players is approximately 6 Mbps.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed an optimal resource allocation algorithm
for D2D players in a game theoretic framework that ensures
that the social utility is maximized and the CU communica-
tions are not hampered. We explain the notion of stochastically
stable states and prove that it is in these system states that a
D2D network’s social utility is maximized. We also extend
this algorithm and propose a heuristic algorithm that shows
good performance in a fading channel with CU mobility.
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